Abstract-We present a novel design technique for hardening Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) against Total Ionizing Dose (TID). There is increasing use of commercial components in space technology and it is important to recognize that the space radiation environment poses the risk of permanent malfunction due to radiation. Therefore, the integrated circuits used for spacecraft electronics must be resistant to radiation. 
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE study of radiation effects on semiconductor devices started about forty years ago, when the first satellites experienced serious problems due to the detrimental effect on their electronic circuits as a result of space radiation. Since then, there has been an increasing interest in the study of circuits which can work in a radiation environment, driven by all the possible applications of these kinds of circuits, such as advanced weaponry, instrumentation for nuclear power plants, high-energy physics experiments and, last but not least space missions and satellites.
The objective of this paper is to present a novel design technique for mitigating the effects of space radiation on satellite electronics, specifically focusing on the radiation tolerance of the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). This study was necessary in order to make the cost of satellite manufacturing Manuscript received December 6, 2006.; revisedMarch 27, 2007 . This work was supported by Telkom SA, Ltd., as part of the Centre of Excellence program.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNS.2007.897402 as low as possible by making use of Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components. However, these COTS components are very susceptible to the hazards of the space environment.
One could also make use of Radiation Hard components for the purpose of satellite manufacturing, however, this will defeat the purpose of making the satellite manufacturing cost as low as possible as the cost of the radiation hard electronic components are significantly higher than their commercial counterparts. Added to this is the undesirable fact that the radiation hard components are a few generations behind as far as speed and performance is concerned, thus providing even greater motivation for making use of Commercial components.
Radiation hardened components are obtained by making use of special processing methods in order to improve the components radiation tolerance. Modifying the process steps is one of the three ways to improve the radiation tolerance of an integrated circuit. The two other possibilities are to use special layout techniques or special circuit and system architectures [1] - [3] .
Another method, in which to make Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon (CMOS) circuits tolerant to ionizing radiation is to distribute the workload among redundant modules (called Modular Redundancy) in the circuit. This new method will be described in detail in the Section IV.
The main focus of this paper is to apply the principles of reconfigurable computing to implement the Modular Redundancy Algorithm in order to mitigate for Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effects in FPGA's. Fundamentally the radiation effects of FPGA's are not different from any other CMOS-based digital IC [4] . Each FPGA is unique in its architecture, and each has its unique response to radiation. However, the issue is to correlate the radiation induced response to the basic mechanisms of the Metal Oxide Silicon (MOS) transistor radiation response. This is possible, because at its lowest level, the FPGA is constructed from MOS transistors.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Following a discussion of the effects of ionizing radiation on the MOS transistor in Section II, a brief description of the FPGA TID response is given in Section III. Section IV provides a detailed description of the proposed SMR design method. The method in which to apply the SMR method is discussed in Section V with the experimental setup discussed in Section VI. Sections VII and VIII provides experimental results and a discussion of the results respectively, and Section IX concludes this paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE MOS RADIATION RESPONSE
The four main processes involved in the radiation response of MOS devices are illustrated in Fig. 1 . First, the ionizing radia- tion acts with the gate oxide layer to produce electron-hole pairs [5] , [6] . Some fraction of the electron-hole pairs recombine depending on the type of incident particle and the applied gate to substrate voltage, i.e., the electric field. The mobility of the electron is orders of magnitude larger than that of the holes in the gate oxide, and is swept away very quickly in the direction of the gate terminal. The time for the electrons to be swept away is on the order of 1 ps [6] . The holes that escape recombination remain near their point of origin. The number of these surviving holes determines the initial response of the device after a short pulse of radiation. The cause of the first process, i.e., the presence of the electric field, is the main motivation for design method described in this paper. The other processes will only be described briefly below.
The second process is the slow transport of holes toward the oxide-silicon interface due to the presence of the electric field. It is this transport that explains the short term recovery of MOS devices [5] . When the holes reach the interface, process 3, they become captured in long term trapping sites and this is the main cause of the permanent threshold voltage shift in MOS devices.
The fourth process is the buildup of interface states in the substrate near the interface. A negative space charge region is created near the interface because of the positive charge buildup of process 3. For a full review of these processes the reader is referred to [5] - [7] and [8] In sub-micron devices, the hole trapping near the Si/SiO2 interface is the primary effect. Charge inversion in the silicon at the interface and as a consequence parasitic leakage paths can be created due to the hole trapping near the Si/SiO2 interface.
There are two kinds of leakage paths. The first is the edgeleakage path between the drain and source at the edge of a NMOSFET. The other kind, called field-leakage path is between any two n+-junctions separated by a field oxide. The edge leakage is usually more serious than the field leakage because of the shorter path length.
In sub-micron devices studied in this paper, the radiation effects due to the gate oxide is negligible because the oxide thickness is too thin to trap net charges and the interface quality is too good to be activated by radiations. For a PMOSFET, the leakages are reduced because the silicon surface is induced to favor the accumulation [4] , [9] .
III. FPGA TID RESPONSE
An FPGA is a semiconductor device containing programmable logic components and programmable interconnects. It is the densest and most advanced programmable logic device. The FPGA allows a designer to implement large digital designs with relative ease at any time and location.
FPGAs are generally slower than their application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) counterparts, can't handle as complex a design, and draw more power. However, they have several advantages such as a shorter time to market, ability to re-program in the field to correct errors, and lower engineering costs. Since this is ideal for spacecraft applications, the space community has actively evaluated radiation effects for most new FPGA's being introduced.
The differences in the radiation response in different FPGA technologies originate in the switches [4] . The Antifuse FPGA routing switch is completely immune to TID effects, and its sensitivity is only determined by its logic part. This is intuitively correct if one considers that the Antifuse switch structure consists of an insulator isolating the top and bottom layers, but when programmed the insulator changes to become a low-resistance link. Therefore, when programmed the switch basically becomes metal or one routing wire touching another routing wire.
The SRAM FPGA's on the other hand consists of SRAM memory cells comprising the configuration memory of the device. Therefore, compared to an Antifuse FPGA, its sensitivity is increased because of the added effects on the SRAM switches.
The TID sensitivity of flash-based FPGA's will likely be determined by the floating gate switches [4] , [10] . However, thus far, flash-based devices have not been completely tested for TID effects. The preliminary test results [4] indicate distinctive abnormality, which is obviously attributed to the radiation effect on the floating-gate switch. Radiation-induced degradation of Flash switches is conjectured to cause the significant propagation delay degradation with total dose. Since the Flash-switches directly pass the signal, the degradation of the switch threshold voltage (VTH) by radiation-induced charge leakage in the floating gate can slow down the signal drastically. Also the radiation-induced traps in the floating gate can potentially impact the charge retention and consequently cause a long-term reliability issue. However, up to now, the radiation effect on the floating gate transistor is not well understood. Literature [11] predicts that it will limit the floating gate memory device to applications below 100 krad (Si). The reader is referred to [12] - [14] and [15] for a good review of FPGA technology.
IV. SWITHCED MODULAR REDUNDENCY
In this section we present the proposed Switched Modular Redundancy (SMR) method. The overall idea of the SMR method is as follows: A charged particle is accelerated in the presence of an electric field. However, in a solid, electrons will move around randomly in the absence of an applied electric field. Therefore if one averages the movement over time there will be no overall motion of charge carriers in any particular direction. On applying an electric field charge carriers will on average move in a direction aligned with the electric field, with positive charge TABLE I carriers such as holes moving in the direction of field, and negative charge carriers moving in the opposite direction.
In process 1 of Fig. 1 , if we apply a zero bias to the gate terminal in the presence of ionizing radiation, both the free electrons and holes will on average remain near their point of origin, and therefore have a greater probability of recombination. The amount of threshold shift in MOS devices caused by ionizing radiation is strongly dependant on the bias voltage applied to the gate both during and after radiation [16] - [19] . The threshold voltage shift in MOS devices will be less severe for the gate terminal in an unbiased condition.
The research by [16] showed that the effect of alternating bias on the radiation response of MOS devices was a reduced amount of hole trapping and interface state buildup in N-channel devices; in P-channel devices a reduced amount of hole trapping was also evident. Thus, for devices which are subject to gate bias cycling, the maximum acceptable dose is higher than if the irradiation bias were applied continuously. By adding redundancy and applying a resting policy, one can significantly prolong the useful life of MOS components in space.
The fact that the rate of the threshold voltage shift in MOS devices is strongly dependant on the bias voltage applied to the gate terminal is a very important phenomenon that can be exploited, since we have direct control and access to the voltage applied to the gate terminal.
If for example, two identical gates were under the influence of radiation and the gate voltage is alternated between the two, then the two gates should be able to withstand more total dose radiation than using only one gate. This redundancy could be used in a circuit to mitigate for total ionizing dose.
The more a MOS transistor is in use (i.e., switched ON); the more positive charge will be accumulated over time. This implies that gates that are longer in the ON state in a circuit will degrade faster than their idle (OFF) counter parts. Hence "ON" gates will suffer first and cause a circuit malfunction.
Consider Fig. 2 . When input A is 0, Transistor T1 is in the ON state and T2 in the OFF state. Thus, in this situation, T1 is degrading in the influence of ionizing radiation, and T2 is annealing. This is illustrated in Table I with an X for degrading and for annealing.
Therefore, if we have a 50% duty cycle between the two transistors, the circuit should last longer than any other duty cycle. In a real digital circuit, the 50% duty cycle will not be the case.
Hence, A might be 0 more often and the result is that T1 will degrade faster. The only requirement for this circuit to malfunction is for one transistor to fail. A solution to this problem would be to add redundancy with an identical module in parallel.
The redundant group consists of two identical components. While the one is in use, the other components inputs are varied between logic 1 and 0. Hence, while the one component is in use, the other component is given a time to anneal.
The same method can be applied similarly to the other fundamental logic gates. Functionally, the circuit is still the same as the original circuit, however, it is more radiation tolerant than the original.
V. APPLYING THE SMR PRINCIPLE IN FPGA'S
The SMR methodology would be to duplicate each gate in a circuit, then selectively only activating one gate at a time allowing the other to anneal during its off cycle. The SMR algorithm is coded in the "C" language.
In the proposed design methodology, the design engineer need not be concerned about radiation effects when describing the hardware implementation in a hardware description language. Instead, the design engineer makes use of conventional design techniques.
When the design is complete, it is synthesized to obtain the gate level netlist in edif format.
The edif netlist is converted to structural VHDL code during synthesis.
The structural VHDL netlist is fed into the SMR "C" algorithm to obtain the identical redundant circuit components. The resultant file is also a structural VHDL netlist.
The generated VHDL netlist or SMR circuit is then mapped to the FPGA. However, the SMR algorithm as explained will not provide TID tolerance for an FPGA implementation as the internal structure of the FPGA is much more complicated. For one, the design engineer has no access to individual gates in an FPGA, and in fact, there are no fundamental gates in FPGA's. The FPGA consists of logic blocks that are configured to implement a function that represents a fundamental gate. Even if we provided redundancy in the logic part of the FPGA, we still would have a configuration memory that is constant for a particular FPGA implementation. For the SRAM-based FPGA as well as the Flash-based FPGA, switched redundancy has to be provided in its configuration memory.
When the SRAM and flash-based FPGA is configured, the configuration memory determines the logic functionality of the FPGA. Hence, for a particular SRAM or flash-based FPGA implementation, the configuration memory is constant. Therefore, if we apply the SMR algorithm to an SRAM or flash-based FPGA implementation, we not only duplicate the logic part of the FPGA, but as a consequence, we also duplicate the configuration memory.
The configuration memory controls the functionality of the FPGA, and depending on the FPGA architecture, consists of either SRAM or Flash memory cells. However, even if we provided cycled redundancy in the logic part of the SRAM or flashbased FPGA, we still have a constant and static configuration memory that degrades under the influence if ionizing radiation. Thus, for the SRAM or flash-based FPGA, in order to mitigate for TID effects, we also have to provide the cycled redundancy to the configuration memory of the FPGA.
This reduces the problem of TID mitigation for the SRAM and flash-based FPGA to that of reconfigurable computing. This concept can be best explained by means of a diagram.
Consider Fig. 3 , which illustrates a simplified depiction of the interconnection between the configuration memory, and the logic part of the FPGA.
If we apply the SMR algorithm to this system, the configuration memory will also be duplicated. Thus, for the SRAM FPGA, we can reset one SRAM cell in the redundant group, while the original circuit is still configured with the other SRAM cell. This basically amounts to in-circuit reconfiguration.
FPGA's can be partially reconfigured to implement Dynamically loadable Hardware Plugin (DHP) modules. A tool called PARBIT has been developed that transforms FPGA configuration bitfiles to enable DHP modules.
With this tool it is possible to define a partial reconfigurable area inside the FPGA and download it into a specified region of the FPGA device [20] . Thus, the above theory can be physically implemented in FPGA's.
Another, and much simpler, way of solving this problem would be to provide no redundancy at all. We can simply load the same circuit into a different part of the configuration memory dynamically, as depicted in Fig. 4 . After some time, the circuit will be reconfigured as in Fig. 3 , and then back to that in Fig. 4 , and so on. Thus, we define a partial reconfigurable area inside the FPGA and download it into a specified region of the FPGA device. In essence, configuration memory swapping is provided between the duplicated memory cells while the FPGA circuit is in operation.
VI. EXPERIMANTAL SETUP AND METHODOLOGY
Total Ionizing Dose Performance was examined at a dose rate of 0.7 rads (Si)/sec (2.5 krad/hour). Testing included in-situ monitoring of key parameters such as Icc, as well as full functional test pre-and post-dose. In addition, at various cumulative dose steps, devices were tested for full functional circuit behavior using the specific vendor's comprehensive test programs. Devices were also reconfigured at various dose steps in order to implement the SMR algorithm, as explained in the previous section. Variation in the performance of the devices with total absorbed dose is presented in the following section, together with the enhanced performance obtained by the SMR method. An illustration of the test setup is shown in Fig. 5 .
The FPGA's are connected to the PC via current sensors, a 12-bit Analogue to Digital Converter and a microprocessor. A software program runs on the PC that monitors and logs the FPGA power supply currents every 2 s. The interface between the FPGA IO blocks and the PC was a FPGA based processor (Actel ProASIC Plus APA075PQ208). The purpose of the microprocessor was to monitor and log the FPGA IO's logic values every 2 s. The expected values of the IO ports are stored on the processor and compared to the FPGA IO logic values, if correct a 0 is sent to the PC, if incorrect (i.e., an error), a 1 is sent to the PC.
In-circuit reconfiguration and JTAG monitoring is provided by means of the Serial Port Interface (SPI). During irradiation testing, the FPGA's were reconfigured; successful reconfiguration is an indication that the configuration memory of the FPGA is still functional. Separate design files were compiled with the Altera Quartus VHDL design software, with each design file representing a different part of the configuration memory. During reconfiguration, a different design file was loaded into memory. For example, design file 1 would be loaded, after some accumulated dose design file 2 would be loaded, then design file 1 again and so on. No extra functionality is needed; the new design is simply downloaded to the FPGA by means of the SPI. Table II gives a summary of the parameters that were tested during the TID tests of the FPGA's. However, the Power supply current is the most important parameter for monitoring TID effects [4] .
Testing was performed utilizing the Cobalt 60 source at the Agriculture Research Council in Stellenbosch, Western Cape, South Africa. Slight annealing at room temperature was observed over night for each test, as the radiation facility was shut down. These anneals resulted in degraded devices returning to a slightly improved performance.
The devices were tested with a voltage regulator (LM7805) on board and without the regulator. It was thought that the regulator's TID tolerance exceeds that of the FPGA and therefore the FPGA could be tested with the regulator on board. No difference in the FPGA radiation response was observed with or without the regulator on the PCB board.
A. Devices Tested
SRAM-based FPGA: 10K10TC144-4 CMOS based from Altera with 10 000 to 250 000 typical gates.
Operating voltage: 5 V Configuration: In-circuit reconfigurability (ICR) via a Serial Programming Interface (SPI).
Gate Oxide: SiO : The FPGA devices were configured with a ring counter code circuit that will be used to configure the device. The circuit is a synchronous digital logic design clocked at 25 MHz. The circuit occupied 8% of the logic elements in the EPF10K10TC144-4 FPGA.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to test the resting policy on SRAM FPGA's, the following setup was used. In the first instance, the FPGA was tested using normal operation and running a ring counter code (Case 1 in Fig. 6 ), while in the second case the FPGA was tested, also running the same code, however the power to the FPGA's were cycled (Case 2 in Fig. 6 ). The idea, as described in Section IV, would be that the FPGA components would not degrade under the influence of ionizing radiation during its off cycle and therefore increasing its lifetime. Fig. 6 shows a comparison between normal FPGA operation (Case 1) and FPGA power cycling (Case 2). The dose rate as previously stated was 0.7 rads (Si)/sec, or about 2.5 krad/h. The FPGA's in case 1 of Fig. 6 started consuming more power supply current at about 15 krad and gradually increased in power supply current. Intermittent IO errors started occurring at 18 krad (Fig 7) until about 22 krad when functional failure occurred, at which point current monitoring was stopped for case 1 of Fig. 6 . The FPGA's in case 2 of Fig. 6 also started consuming more power supply current, however at a slower rate as case 1. In this case, when the current drops to zero, power to the FPGA is switched off. Spacing of the power cycling dips towards the end of the test was different to the spacing before about 21 krad. The reasons for this is that after 21 krad, the slope of the curve increases dramatically with increasing absorbed dose, thus, power to the FPGA's has to be cycled faster to prevent functional failure.
For case 2, the FPGA's were still functionally intact after 30 krad when the testing was stopped. This result shows that one can make use of system or device redundancy to increase the lifetime of SRAM FPGA's in space. However, in order to increase the FPGA's lifetime without making use of redundancy at the system level, one would have to provide redundancy internally by means of the SMR algorithm. Further testing was performed with the Altera FPGA, with the conditions as shown in Fig. 8 .
For the FPGA configured, but not clocked (case 2, Fig 8) , the TID response is the same as with the normal operation (Case The FPGA is configured, but the clock signal is removed. Hence, no switching takes place in the switch matrix. Case 3: Normal operation, however the configuration memory were reset every 2.5 krad, and then reprogrammed again after a further approx 2.5 krad. For the time that the configuration memory is cleared, the power to the FPGA is still on. 1). Thus for case 2 of Fig. 8 , the configuration memory is constant, but the switching matrix is not clocked. The zero clocking appears to have no effect. Thus, one could infer that the configuration memory plays an important role in the radiation response of the SRAM FPGA. This is because, although the FPGA is not clocked, the configuration memory is still constant, and degrades under the influence of ionizing radiation, as stated in Section V.
In case 3 of Fig 8, the FPGA is configured, and then tested in a radiation field as in case 1. However, after 2.5 krad, the configuration memory is reset, without switching off the FPGA power. For this case, the TID tolerance is much better than normal operation (Case 1). In fact, it is similar to when power was completely reset as in Fig. 6 . This result agrees with the analysis of Section V. Since when the FPGA configuration memory is reset, its SRAM cells (or transistors) are reset and thus does not degrade in the presence of ionizing radiation. This is a very favorable result, because by building redundancy into the configuration memory (i.e., internally to the FPGA), one could significantly increase the lifetime of the SRAM FPGA in a radiation environment.
Spacing of the reconfiguration cycling dips towards the end of the test was different to the spacing at the beginning. The reasons for this is that toward the end of the test, as previously observed with the power cycling case where the slope of the curve increases dramatically with increasing absorbed dose, the power to the FPGA's has to be cycled faster to prevent functional failure.
Consider Fig. 9 , after the FLEX 10 K device has been configured, it was reconfigured in-circuit by loading to a different part of the configuration memory as described in Section V. However, the same IO ports were used during each reconfiguration. Hence, only the internal FPGA core is different for each reconfiguration. This is represented by case 2 and 3. Reconfiguration requires less than 320 ms during system operation. The FPGA with normal operation (case 1) failed functionally at about 20 krad, at which point current monitoring was stopped, whereas the reconfigured FPGA's failed functionally at about 33 krad. With the FPGA reconfiguration a 65% increase in functional lifetime is observed.
In case 4 of Fig 9, the FPGA was reconfigured with both a different part of the configuration memory as well as different IO ports. Hence, a different internal core was used during each reconfiguration, as well as different IO ports. There seems to be an improved performance in case 4 compared to cases 2 and 3. However, with increasing absorbed dose, case 4's current soon increases and the FPGA failed functionally at 34 krad. The above results indicate that FPGA internal core redundancy provided TID mitigation, however, by provided IO port redundancy does not further add to the functional lifetime of the FPGA.
Further, if one looks at Fig 10, which shows the IO current of the FPGA versus the absorbed dose, the IO current does not increase for an increase in absorbed radiation dose for the entire measurement period.
This does not mean that the IO ports are immune against TID, however, the results does suggest that the IO ports have a higher tolerance to the radiation than the FPGA core for the measured absorbed dose. One can thus safely say that the FPGA core is the first and main source of the FPGA power supply current increase.
Thus one can make use of the same IO ports for each reconfiguration and thus do not have to make changes to the PCB board.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In the above experiments, two times redundancy was provided. However, in a space application, depending on the size of the circuit compared to the capacity of the FPGA, more than two times redundancy can be used to prolong the lifetime of the device. For example, in order to use the above SMR methodology, the circuit should be at most 50% of the device capacity in order to duplicate the circuit internally. Depending on the satellite orbit, and hence the required total absorbed dose of the mission, the amount of redundancy can be evaluated to meet the mission requirements. In our experiments with the Altera EPF10K10TC144-4 SRAM FPGA, we obtained a 65% increase in functional lifetime with two times redundancy, i.e., instead of failing at 20 krad, the FPGA failed functionally at 33 krad. In order to further increase the FPGA functional lifetime, one would have to add additional redundancy. However, what complicates the matter is that it does not appear that the total absorbed dose at which functional failure occurs is linear with the number of redundancies. For example, one would have expected two times redundancy to correspond to a functional failure dose of 40 krad, if functional failure with no redundancy occurs at 20 krad. Thus, in order to use this methodology, one would have to test the percentage increase in functional lifetime for each amount of circuit duplication in order to assess the required amount of redundancy. Also, because each FPGA technology is unique in its architecture, and each has its unique response to radiation, every new FPGA has to be tested to determine the percentage increase in functional lifetime.
It was shown experimentally that by applying FPGA system or device redundancy on a power cycling basis, the system lifetime is increased significantly. Device redundancy mitigation is an alternative method to internal FPGA mitigation. In terms of prolonged functional lifetime, no distinction can be made between device redundancy and internal FPGA redundancy. However, device redundancy is the most costly solution in terms of both PCB board space and device costs.
It is noted that the scheme does not make provision for Single Event Effects (SEE) mitigation, however, whenever a reconfiguration cycle is started, the configuration memory is reset and hence any configuration errors due to SEE will be corrected. However, it is not sufficient to update the configuration SRAM memory continuously to remove any bit errors induced by SEEs, since the effect of the configuration change will change the logic which in turn will potentially lead to the change of the internal state of the design, i.e., the state of the various registers and flip-flops [21] . By correcting the configuration SRAM memory, one can repair the logic, but not re-establish the state of the circuit. Thus, to properly provide for any SEE effects, one would have to apply Triple Modular Redundancy in addition to the SMR methodology.
IX. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new design technique for TID mitigation in Field Programmable Gate Arrays. The method consists of applying Switched Modular Redundancy to configuration memory in the FPGA. For devices which are subject to gate bias cycling, the maximum acceptable dose is higher than if the irradiation bias were applied continuously. By adding redundancy and applying a resting policy, one can significantly prolong the useful life of MOS components in space. It was shown experimentally that by applying FPGA system redundancy on a power cycling basis, the system lifetime is increased significantly. By resetting the configuration memory, the functional lifetime of the FPGA resembles that of power cycling. By applying redundancy in the configuration memory, the lifetime of the SRAM FPGA was increased in the presence of ionizing radiation. It was also shown through the current consumption of the IO ports, that the IO ports are not as susceptable to radiation as the FPGA core, which is the main cause of the increase in power supply current in the presence of ionizing radiation.
